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Abstract 
In some applications of sensor networks, multi-domain exists and cooperation among domains could lead 
to longer lifetime. In this paper, we consider heterogeneous multi-domain sensor networks. It means that 
different networks belong to different domains and sensors are deployed at the same physical location and 
their topology is heterogonous. Apparently, domains life time can be increased by means of cooperation 
in packet forwarding; however selfishness is inevitable from rational perspective. We investigate this 
problem to find out cooperation of authorities while their sensors are energy aware. When sensors are 
energy aware, spontaneous cooperation cannot take place. Therefore we presented the Adaptive Energy 
Aware strategy, a novel algorithm that is based on TIT-FOR-TAT, starts with generosity and ends up with 
conservative behaviour. Our simulation results showed that this algorithm could prolong its network 
lifetime in competition with other networks. 
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1. Introduction 
   In some application of WSNs, different domains have been deployed in the same field and they are 
under control of different authorities. The most important advantage of authorities with these situations is 
to give each other free riding and ask others for free riding in order to prolong their network lifetime.  
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This behaviour is due to the fact that transmitting a packet is the most energy depleting task in WSNs. If 
the sensors are able to send their data through multi-hops that are close to them, they will survive more. 
Would cooperation happen spontaneously? Or each of them would cheat on the other and try to exploit 
others for its own benefit. This is a critical question and the response to this question is available through 
game theory because it is the tool to analyze strategies between rational decision makers. 
   Game theory has been widely applied to solve these problems in adhoc and sensor networks. Two 
approaches have been formed to deal with them: 1) reputation and punishment 2) pricing and payment 
techniques [1]. However most mature studies belong to adhoc field and because of major differences 
between WSN and adhoc most approaches are not applicable on WSNs. 
   If nodes are not aware of their energy, spontaneous cooperation will happen. As soon as they become 
energy aware which is realistic assumption these days, they will act defectively because they know there 
is an end to this cooperation. We propose a novel algorithm which enforces cooperation among 
authorities and tries to be generous in the beginning of the game. Then it will become more conservative 
as sensors are close to the end of their life. 
   As far as we concerned, it is for the first time that cooperation is being evaluated in realistic situations 
where routing is considered to be hierarchical and topology is heterogeneous. An adaptive energy aware 
strategy which not only works based on the feedback of other authorities but also tries not to be 
exploitable facing selfish authorities. Additionally, it makes cooperation more feasible by its generous 
behaviour. 
2. Related work 
   Cooperation in adhoc networks has been addressed differently. Some of the researchers found out how 
to deal with it through reputation and punishment based mechanisms like [2-5], while others encourage 
cooperation with pricing and reputation [6-9]. However in adhoc each node belongs to different 
authorities which 
these approaches cannot work well in this area. 
   Nevertheless, the most similar paper in adhoc to our work could be [5] and the similarity is analysis of 
cooperation without incentives; also they used GTFT as reputation-punishment mechanism to obtain Nash 
equilibrium. Finally, while in our model sensors send data to sink stations through cluster heads; they 
randomly choose sets of nodes to communicate.  
   In [10], authors demonstrated that cooperation is not evolutionary stable and they proposed a (patient 
grim trigger) strategy which enforces cooperation by punishment. However they did not consider energy 
awareness in nodes and they have just studied packet forwarding. Furthermore their strategy is not 
adaptable and its behaviour changes after permanent iterations. Authors in [11] have proposed dynamic 
incentive mechanism based on evolutionary game, which seems unnecessary in the case of own interest of 
sensors and authorities, Although the main problem is that considering selfishness within one authority is 
an unrealistic situation in WSN, because selfish behaviour within single authority happens only when the 
node is compromised. Compromised nodes use selfish behaviour as a covering action and the incentive 
mechanism cannot enforce cooperation with malice. 
In [12], which looks to be the extended version of [13], a different study in this area is presented. In both 
studies, it is stated that cooperation happens spontaneously in WSN and there is no need to enforce 
cooperation, which is on the contrary of other studies. However [12] showed that how self interests of 
sensors stimulate cooperation in WSN. Another point is that their study is not applicable in  
heterogeneous environment because as they have mentioned, increasing the nodes will decrease the 
percentage of cooperation and in heterogeneous environment we have virtually increased nodes. 
Furthermore a selfish network can easily prolong its lifetime as they have mentioned by a strategy which 
they called it smart. Moreover our presented study simulated in more realistic scenario which is cluster 
routing instead of minimum transmission energy routing which is out of  practice.  
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3. Model assumption  
   We considered plenty of tiny, limited battery-power devices called sensors. These sensors are two 
types: normal sensors and advanced sensors. Both are battery powered but advanced sensors battery 
lifetime is twice more than the normal ones. We assume all sensors can communicate with each other, 
even if they are under control of different authorities which means that interoperability is guaranteed. We 
assume there is no packet loss, and any packet drop is based on strategic decisions of sensors facing 
different authorities. 
   It is supposed that time is slotted, and all sensors have data to send per round. Another assumption is the 
similarity of all communication packets in size. Each domain has randomly deployed its sensors in the 
same filed. We assume there is only one sink in the middle of the field which receives all data. 
   The routing is supposed to be hierarchical. We used [14] as our routing protocol, which guarantees that 
energy is distributed by dynamic clustering and clusters heads aggregate reports from sensors and forward 
them to the sink. However, because of our heterogeneous topology we use SEP [15] as our cluster head 
election mechanism. Based on our routing, it is supposed that in each round a node can play the role of a 
sensor which sends data to a cluster head (CH) or the cluster head which receives data from its child and 
sends aggregated reports to the sink. So if a node becomes a sensor it can ask opponent network CH to 
send its data and if a node become CH it can accept to receive opponent sensor data to transmit it with 
 their own 
network nearest CH. 
   Based on these situations each node can have any strategy, like cooperative strategy which asks for 
others help and gives help, or non-cooperative strategy which ask for help and neither gives help, 
or behavioural strategy which takes next step based on the history of opponent movement. 
   Another assumption is that routing among domains is performed properly which means that sensors 
advertise correctly and each sensor can join the nearest cluster head. Sensors are supposed to be energy 
aware and their energy decreases based on their given tasks per round. Finally it is assumed that sensors 
are pre-programmed. 
4. Sensor network prisoner dilemma 
   Game theory is a tool for modelling strategic decision making situations [16]; while players cannot 
enforce agreements through third parties and make decisions independently, they may cooperate; however 
any cooperation must be self-enforcing. Thus our model falls into the category of non-cooperative games 
[17]. We used iterated prisoners dilemma for modelling our game between parties where betrayal is same 
as non-cooperation and silence is cooperation. The reason of deploying this model among parties rather 
than sensors is due to the fact that parties are the ones looking for better payoff which is longer lifetime 
for their networks, instead of sensors. Sensors are tools for achieving this goal. 
   In the iterated prisoners dilemma when the game is played exactly N times and both of the players are 
aware of it, it is always optimal to defect in all rounds. Defection is the only Nash equilibrium. The proof 
is easy and it is inductive [17]. 
   To enforce cooperation between two players, the number of rounds should be random or one of the 
players should be unaware of the end of. In this situation defection may no longer be a dominant strategy. 
Strategy which could stimulate cooperation should be behavioural [17]. Behavioural strategy performs 
next move based on the last observation. Game theory shows that when the probability of next round is 
more than a half, cooperation happens by using TFT strategy. To use this strategy in sensor networks we 
should add following features to the basic strategy: 1-Strategy should not be static and should adapt itself 
to opponent network. 2-Each node should decide locally without global feedback. 3-Strategy should not 
to be exploitable and should be able to stop selfishness. 4-Strategy should be scalable. 5-Strategy should 
stimulate cooperation.6-Strategy should be energy aware. 
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   Based on TFT strategy, number one to four are provided and by generosity number five is reachable. 
Since we assume (1) the two networks are deployed randomly at the same time, (2) the number of both 
networks in terms of normal an advanced are the same, (3) and the routing and selection mechanism for 
cluster head is the same, hence the existence of next round for the two networks is approximately 
identical, which means if they act cooperatively to the end of the game, the life of their networks is 
approximately like each other. However each node should ask another network and give help to another 
network based on existence of next round. We make the existence of next round under conditions, which 
have been explained below; next round for normal node exists when:  
 
               (Ec > Etr(to sink)   ((Erc)*(max child))+Etr(max dist))                                      (1) 
 
   In the worst case, sensor should transmit its data to a cluster head which is very close to the sink. 
Because of that if the current energy (Ec) is higher than transmission energy to sink (Etr(to sink))or 
slightly less, then a sensor has enough energy to pass the next round. Furthermore there should be a 
cluster head to transmit reported data to the sink  a cluster head is and how 
many children it has, we consider the worst case which it placed on farthest point (Etr(max dist)) that is 
radius of rectangle and the number of children is the maximum number, too.  
Next round for cluster head exists when: 
 
               Ec > ((Erc)*(max child)+Etr(to sink)                                                                                         (2)    
                                                          
  The worst case for a cluster head happens when it has the highest number of children to receive their 
data plus sending the aggregated data to the sink. 
 
5.  Adaptive energy aware cooperation algorithm 
 
   Each node starts with generosity so each sensor sets its cooperation probability Pc, cooperation rate Rc 
to max and defection rate Rd to min. When the node is at the end of its life, it will act conservatively in 
cooperation by dividing the Pc into two and setting Rc to min number and Rd to max. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Fig. 1. Algorithm flowchart 
 
Pc=0.9, Rc=Rmax, Rd=Rmin
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5. Simulation 
   There are two sensor networks with separate operators which are distributed randomly on the ground. 
The simulation parameters are declared in table 1. Parameters are based on hierarchical routing [14] and 
SEP [15]. In order to evaluate this algorithm and strategy we programmed one of the two networks with 
our adaptive strategy. Then we placed four other networks opposed to ours. 
Table1. Simulation parameters 
Parameter Value 
Number of nodes per domain 50 
Sensors distribution Uniformly random 
Area size 100*100 M 
Sink position 50, 50 
Normal Sensor Initial battery  0.5 U 
Advanced Sensor Initial battery  1 U 
Cluster head selection SEP  
Receive and send fixed cost  0.00022 U 
Routing Hierarchical 
Advanced sensor percentage 10% 
 
   This evaluation is done in order to specify longer lifetime between two players. The Benefit of this 
evaluation is that longer lifetime is the best payoff and each party wants longer lifetime for its own 
network. For decreasing the impact of random topology we run each simulation twenty times and the 
results are the average numbers. Network 1: This network operates based on the opposite party feedback 
(like TFT). Network 2: At the beginning this network starts the game with suspicious and when facing 
cooperation of the opposite party, goes for feedback play. In this simulation we used STFT strategy. 
Network 3: This network plays irrational and makes decisions irrationally. Network 4: The goal of this 
network is exploit other network; it applies smart strategy like what [12] has been mentioned, it always 
asks for help but never gives help. To make this strategy smarter, it starts with cooperation to make 
reputation and after some random rounds plays defection and waits to see opponent feedback.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Adaptive network in competition with other networks 
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    It will change to cooperation after seeing the first defection, then repeats the same algorithm to the end. 
After the Adaptive network, Suspicious and Selfish networks respectively have the longest lifetime. The 
reason is that the Suspicious one starts with defection and the Selfish one acts smartly.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
   In this paper, we have addressed the problem of cooperation in packet forwarding between multi-
domain networks. We have showed how spontaneous cooperation cannot happen since nodes are energy 
aware and we have demonstrated that without adapting a strategy, networks are too exploitable in facing 
selfish network. Furthermore we used TFT as our basic strategy and we added generosity and adaptability 
to our novel algorithm strategy to have more flexible and scalable strategy. Additionally it is worth 
mentioning that we used hierarchical routing and heterogeneous topology to have more realistic scenario. 
The adaptive energy aware strategy enforces cooperation between networks and decreases the generosity 
gradually after each round. When nodes reach to the end of their life they become conservative in 
cooperation. The simulation results demonstrate that our strategy can defeat irrational feedback, 
suspicious strategy and extend its lifetime. In Addition, selfish network which uses smart strategy cannot 
exploit our network and can only prolong its network lifetime for a short time. 
   However we used non-cooperative game theoretic model for the game (like some other researchers), but 
in reality, cooperative game is a possible situation when parties reach to an agreement before starting the 
game. We will investigate packet forwarding in cooperative games in our future research and we will also 
work on routing in multi-domain wireless sensor networks. 
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